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THE CONSTITUTION AND A "PLANNED ECONOMY"
Henry Rottschaefer *

A

LITTLE more than a decade has passed since the collapse of
the wildest speculative orgy ever indulged in by a nation not
markedly given to underestimating its own economic and financial
potentialities. It came at a time when the conjuncture of world-wide
economic forces combined with almost world-wide unsound practices in
the fields of international trade and finance had created an extremely
unstable economic situation throughout the world. It would require a
degree of optimism as large as' that entertained by the speculative community during the "boom period" to believe that the measures and
policies adopted and followed during the past decade have solved the
political and economic problems with which the whole world has been
wrestling during the years since what has now come to be called World
War I. No such doubts can be entertained concerning the marked
changes that have occurred during the past decade in the political, economic and social philosophies of both the leaders and the general mass
of the population in this, as in other countries. It is beyond the purview of this study to trace the precise manner in which many forces and
causes have contributed to these changes. This article will be limited
to considering the extent to which these shifts in belief and opinion
have affected the judicial interpretations of the Constitution in a direction that will make it legally possible to realize the changing views as
to the proper functions of government in the control and direction of
the nation's social and economic life.
The due consideration of this problem will be aided by a brief preliminary discussion of the most significant of the shifts in political,
economic and social philosophies that have occurred within the United
States during the past decade. The first of these is the sharp decline
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of faith in individualism as a social philosophy, particularly of that
brand thereof associated with the theory of laissez-faire. This has been
due, in part at least, to the fact that private individual initiative suffered a serious\collapse at the time when the depression began, a collapse that became intensified as the full effects of the economic deflation
threatened losses on a scale which investors and owners were unwilling
to take. Governmental intervention was sought and given, and the
view began to be expressed and to gain increasing acceptance that such
intervention alone could prevent utter chaos and complete ruin. It is
small wonder that individualism lost caste and that theories of government of a socialistic character gained ground.
The other important shifts in belief and opinion are largely connected with speculations aimed at explaining the unprecedented economic debacle. The view received general acceptance that, since its
causes were at least of nationwide scope, the remedies should be nationwide also. It was a natural, if not inevitable, corollary of this view that
federal intervention was absolutely essential; and this view was
strengthened by the fact that the principal attempts at leadership emanated from the federal government. During all this time all manner
of persons, qualified and unqualified, were offering remedies based on
purported analyses of the sources of our economic difficulties. Some
of these were. accepted by governmental authorities, and became in due
course the bases of ambitious pians to solve those difficulties through
legislation. The most important of such theories were those that advocated a shift towards a so-called planned economy, those that stressed
the view that the capacity of the nation to proquce had exceeded its
power successfully to distribute the goods and services produced, and
those ( closely related to the preceding) that accepted various dogmas
of a deficiency in purchasing power that was to be cured by governmental redistribution of income.
The net effect has been a shift in political, economic and social philosophies from individualism toward socialism, from acceptance of an
economic system operating in response to the profit motive to belief in
one in which government planning and direction is to play an increased
role, from a social philosophy which admitted the duty of government
to intervene in the distribution of income to a limited extent to one
urging government to interpose for that purpose on an ever increasing
scale, and from a political and constitutional theory of rather restricted
federal activity to one in which the federal government was assigned
the major role in realizing the social objectives explicit or implicit in
the new approaches to our social and economic problems. Only in the
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light of these considerations is it possible to make an intelligible survey
of the constitutional struggles that have occurred within recent times.
It is apparent from an examination of the changes discussed in the
preceding paragraphs that they involve the introduction of no wholly
new elements into our political, economic and social philosophies. It
is probable that no social philosophy has ever gained acceptance that
wholly denied the validity of recognizing interests of the type denoted
by the phrase "social interests," and it is certain that no such social
theory has prevailed within our western civilization during the period
of our national existence. The theory that it was the duty of government
to intervene in the economic life of a people constituted an assumption
of economic theory even during the period when laissez faire was at its
height. The use of governmental power to redistribute a people's income and wealth through taxation and the expenditure of tax revenues
was an accepted practice long before the enactment of the federal system of social security taxes. It is sufficient merely to mention the trend
towards expanding the powers of the federal government in our dual
system of government. The changes in our political, economic and social
philosophies represent merely shifts of emphasis. The same is true,
broadly speaking, of the changes that have occurred in recent judicial
interpretations of the Constitution. But shifts in emphasis may attain
a magnitude such that the underlying legal and institutional framework is recognizable with the greatest difficulty. It is the hope of some,
and the fear of others, that this is exactly what has happened and will
continue to happen.
The easiest approach to the problems to be discussed is by treating
them all as aspects of the major problem of the extent to which recent
constitutional decisions render possible a planned economy. The phrase
"planned economy" is sometimes used for purposes of making an invidious comparison with the economic system of pre-depression days.
Those who thus use it intend to imply that the latter was properly to
be viewed as one from which all planning was absent. Nothing could
be farther from the truth. It may be that its system of planning was
inadequate, and it may be that this inadequacy was due to the character
of the immediate motive that guided such planning, or to a failure to
develop efficient mechanisms and institutions for integrating the separate plannings of a vast number of individual planners into an effective instrument for organizing the nation's and the world's economic
resources and activities. That would at most warrant a judgment as to
the efficiency of such a system of planning. The phrase will not be used
in that sense in the ensuing discussion. It will be employed to denote
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a system in which government assumes a dominant and decisive part
in directing and controlling the economic activities of the p·eople, a
system in which such direction and control supplant the direction and
control of individuals or groups working through a vast system of
markets and guided by market prices in reaching those judgments that
must inevitably be made by some person or group under any conceivable
system of planning.
There are various types of governmental economic planning. The
most extreme form would be that in which government exercised complete control and direction, by itself assuming the functions of owner
of the nation's productive resources and of entrepreneur in their use and
operation. This would constitute a system of state capitalism. The
transition to such a system, and its operation, whether by the federal
government or by the states, would raise numerous constitutional problems. There has, however, been no attempt as yet to adopt so ambitious
a scheme of economic planning, and hence there is no occasion presently
to discuss those problems. It will only be nei::essary to consider problems of that genf:!ral character in connection with particular and limited
instances of governmental assumption of business activities. These
will be subsequently discussed at appropriate points. The principal
constitutional issues that have thus far arisen have involved that form
of governmental economic planning in which government has intensified its regulation of privately conducted economic activities by developing new forms of control or extending old forms into areas theretofore immune therefrom. The avowed purpose has been to adapt the
system of private enterprise to new social demands which it was
deemed that system would have to satisfy as a condition to its survival. This has been the avowed purpose of even those excursions of
government into the fields of business enterprise heretofore deemed
reserved to private enterprise. These latter can, therefore, be best discussed as parts of a general plan of economic planning through governmental regulation of private enterprise.
The ultimate purpose of embarking upon a planned economy was
to achieve objectives which, it was thought, were not being attained by
the existing system, or which were not being attained as extensively
and as efficiently as they could be obtained through additional governmental regulation. A further aim was to eliminate some of the undesirable results of that system. Recent events, and earlier experiences,
had made the public extremely conscious of the lack of economic stability achieved under the older system. Nor had that system ever lacked
critics who charged against it grave social injustices and a socially un-
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desirable distribution of wealth and income. It is quite apparent that
the theory underlying some of the measures adopted has been that
there existed a high degree of correlation between the social shortcomings of the existing system and its recognized instability, particularly at the stage of development that had been reached by our economic
system. The legislation, enacted by both the states and the federal
government, may fairly be taken as indicating the particular points
in the economic system where further governmental control was
deemed necessary, as well as the character of regulation deemed
proper to secure a more stable and equitable private economic order.
The decisions passing on constitutional aspects of such legislation constitute the principal source of light on the problem of how far an economic regime of private enterprise can constitutionally be molded into
the shape of a planned economy. This article will not consider any
phase of any legislation so far as merely aimed at postponing the realization of losses that had in fact been incurred through the depression,
or at shifting such losses to others than those suffering them in the
first instance.
The federal government and the states both intensified their regulation of the economic system, but leadership and direction were furnished principally by the former. Its activities will accordingly receive
the emphasis which their greater importance merits.

I
CONTROL OF PRODUCTION

A.

Validity of Voluntary Subsidy System-Taxing and
Spending Powers
The specific legislative measures adopted were largely determined
by the accepted theories evolved to explain the economic debacle. These
had stressed excessive production under the impetus of uncontrolled
competition. It was, ·therefore, inevitable that government should aim
at production control, especially in those fields in which production
clearly exceeded the market demand at prices required to make it
profitable or even to enable producers to carry their debt-load. The
major field in which direct attempts at limiting production were undertaken was that of agriculture. It was, however, a well established
principle of constitutional law that production, even for the interstate
market, was not itself a part of interstate commerce.1 Its direct control
1 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 S. Ct. 6 (1888); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
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by compulsory methods thus lay outside the. then denned limits of the
federal commerce power. Unless the judiciary could be persuaded to
adopt a rather extreme organismic view of economic activities as a basis
for redefining the scope of that power, this approach would prove
legally impossible. The Supreme Court had never accepted the view
that Congress possessed a power to promote the general welfare apart
from an exercise of one or more of its delegated powers, nor the theory
that it could act to deal with matters affecting the nation as a whole
with which the states could not deal adequately or at all. 2 This approach too was thus effectively barred. Congress chose instead a noncompulsory system which relied upon a subsidy to secure compliance
with a federally devised and operated plan for limiting production.
This involved a use of its power to tax and expend public revenues to
pay that subsidy. It was. this plan which was declared invalid in the
case of United States v. Butler,8 a decision that provoked as violent a
division in the Court as it did among lawyers and the public generally.
The ultimate basis for the decision was that, since a compulsory system
of the control of agricultural production lay outside the scope of federal powers, Congress was equally powerless to invade the reserved
powers of the states by purchasing compliance and thus indirectly accomplishing the prohibited end. The tax imposed to defray the cost
of the subsidy was held invalid, as was the·plan of regulation itself.
This denial to the federal government of power to secure production control through a system of subsidies to producers has proved
but temporary. The general position of the minority of the Court in
the Butler case clearly became that of a majority in the decisions sustaining the system of taxes levied by the statutes that established systems of unemployment and old age compensation.4 The principal attack on the levy of these taxes rested for its validity on the assumption
that they were invalid because constituting integral parts of a scheme
for expending federal funds in connection with th9se systems of compensation, even though there was no allocation of the proceeds of such
taxes to that purpose. The decisions, therefore, may be taken to decide
definitely that an expenditure of federal funds in financing unemployment and old age compensation systems is an expenditure thereof to
"provide for the general welfare of the United States." The fact that
such measures were properly deemed by Congress to be necessary to
promote the social and economic welfare of the nation was heavily
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936).
297 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
4 Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).
2
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relied upon to sustain their validity. This is in substantial accord with
the minority position in the Butler case that "the power to tax and
spend includes the power to relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment." 5
Furthermore, in C. C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis 6 the Court,
in denying that the credit provision of the tax law there involved
invalidly coerced the states, stated that
"We do not say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of Congress, if it is laid upon the condition that a state may escape its
operation through the adoption of a statute unrelated in subject
matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy and
power."
It is reasonable to imply from this that Congress may impose conditions
in its exercise of its taxing powers if such conditions are related to
activities "fairly within the scope of national policy and power," even
though such condition is aimed at securing state action. But, if that be
true, it would seem to be equally valid to impose conditions aimed at
securing the co-operation of private persons if such conditions meet the
test above set forth. And, if it may so condition exercises of its taxing
power, equally so may it condition exercises of its spending power by
conditions meeting that test. A condition aimed and calculated to make
expenditures effective for realizing the general welfare would clearly
be one that met the test laid down. It is at least certain that the condition imposed by the act involved in the Butler case would be held to
meet it, and, therefore, be held valid even when aimed at controlling
production in fields of economic activity in which excessive production
might reasonably be held by Congress to be responsible for nationwide
economic ills. It follows that federal action to subsidize a federal program of production control would now be sustained in probably every
instance, since the Court is not likely to substitute its ideas of whether
nationwide economic ills are due to uncontrolled production for those
of Congress on that matter.

B.

Validity of Compulsory Syste~Marketing Quotas-Commerce fower
The likelihood that some producers may refuse to cooperate in a
plan of production control on a voluntary basis, however slight that
may be when co-operation is induced by subsidy payments, is one that
forces consideration of a compulsory system of control. The Supreme
5

6

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I at.88, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
301 U.S. 548 at 590, 57 S. Ct. 833 (1937).
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Court has never yet held that the mere fact that goods are produced
with a view to shipment to interstate markets transforms their production into interstate commerce. Nor has it ever held that a compulsory
control of the production of such goods lies within the federal commerce or any other federal power. 7 Federal control of prodµction can,
however, be indirectly ad:~ieved through control over marketing the '
goods in interstate markets. 8
The power of the federal government to regulate activities and
transactions on those markets that comprise a practically indispensable
part of the machinery for the interstate distribution of our major agricultural products had been sustained long before the depression. Some
of the regulations had been upheld on the theory that sales thereon
were an integral part of the current of interstate commerce in such goods;
others on the theory that they were proper means for protecting interstate commerce from burdens resulting from activities on such markets. 9
This power had been held, in the case last cited, to include that of limiting sales of futures to markets approved by federal authorities required
to give their approval to only those markets that complied with specified
conditions. The same theories would justify federal regulation of cash
sales on such markets. The validity of such legislation has been sustained
not only as to sales for the interstate market but as to those for an intrastate market as well.10 Such type of compulsory control of the interstate
marketing process might, if too burdensome, affect production to some·
slight extent, but would scarcely avail to secure a very extensive production control.
Effective control was, however, secured when the Supreme Court
upheld the principle of limiting interstate trade to a federally determined national marketing quota.11 The statute in question authorized the secretary of agriculture, upon making certain findings of fact,
to proclaim a national marketing quota to be in effect for the subsequent
7 This discussion will not consider the extent to which production control and
other phases of economic planning could be validly enforced by the federal government during a war, or as a preparation for war.
8 This discussion will deal principally with interstate markets. It would, however,
be equally applicable to marketing goods in foreign commerce. The principles developed will also be applicable to marketing in the intrastate market so far as that lies
within federal control as an incident to the regulation of marketing in the interstate or
foreign markets.
9 Chicago Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470_ (1923).
1 ° Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379 (1939).
11 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648 (1939).
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marketing year. It was to be operative unless disapproved by more
than one-third of the producers of the particular crop for the preceding
marketing year. The quota, if not thus disapproved, was allocated by
an elaborate system aimed at fixing the quota which each individual
producer would be permitted to market during the marketing year
for which a national quota had been approved. Sales by any producer
in excess of his allotted quota were subject to such heavy penalties as to
insure that such sales would be made at a loss. The plan applied as
well to those who had opposed it as to those who had voted in its
favor, and was, accordingly, a purely compulsory measure as to the
former. It was held to constitute a valid regulation of interstate commerce. The majority opinion of the Court solemnly affirmed that
the statute did not purport to regulate production, but was a mere
regulation of interstate commerce which it reached at the throat where
the commodity entered the stream of commerce, the marketing warehouse. It was stated that any rule, such as that embodied in the statute,
was a valid exercise of the commerce power if aimed at fostering, protecting or conserving interstate commerce, or at preventing the fl.ow
of such commerce from working harm to the people of the nation. It
was further asserted that, since the grant of the power was unlimited in
its terms, regulation extended to the prohibition of such commerce, and,
a fortiori, to the limitation of the amount of a given commodity which
might be transported in such commerce. The power to subject sales for
the intrastate market to the same regulation ( which would mean liability to the prescribed penalty if total sales by any producer exceeded his
allotted quota) was sustained where it is not known what sales were to be
for the intrastate market. The precise scope of this last position is not
clear. It is perfectly clear, however, that the scope of Congress' power to
prohibit interstate commerce had never before been stated in such
sweeping terms, terms that give more than plausibility to the view that
it is practically unlimited.
If subsequent decisions follow the trend evinced in this decision,
that view will have to be accepted as law, and federal power to control
the nation's economic system will have been greatly increased. 12 The
bulk of production in our economic system is undoubtedly intended for
the interstate and foreign markets. It is too patent to require argument
12 It is a practical certainty that Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38
S. Ct. 529 (1918), can no longer be considered law after the decision in Mulford v.
Smith.
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that those who produce with a view to profit are not going to produce
goods in excess of those which they will be permitted to market. Federal power to establish marketing quotas for the interstate and foreign
markets, and to prohibit interstate and foreign shipments in excess of
such quotas, thus constitutes an effective instrument for federal control
of production.
This would be so even if the federal government were powerless
to fix marketing quotas for the intrastate market. It is, however, a well
established doctrine that the federal government may regulate purely
intrastate matters so far as their regulation is necessary or appropriate
to effectuating a policy which it may validly seek to realize in the field
of interstate and foreign commerq;:.13 It is on that theory that federal
regulations of the type involved in the system employed for controlling
the purchase and distribution of milk in marketing areas, established
under federal authority, have been held valid for milk being marketed
in intrastate commerce as well as for that being marketed in interstate
commerce.14 It is at least conceivable that fixing intrastate marketing
quotas may reasonably be held by Congress to be necessary or appropriate for achieving the purposes for which interstate marketing quotas are
being established. It is, accordingly, quite probable that direct federal
fixing of such intrastate quotas would be sustained as a valid exercise of
the commerce power. To the extent that this will be sustained, to that
extent will the scope of federal production control be expanded and its
effectiveness increased.
Federal production control has thus far been invoked almost wholly
in connection with agricultural products, but there is nothing in the
principle, nor in the reasoning used to support it, limiting the method
to such products. The decision sustaining the quota system affirms that
it may be validly used if intended to protect or foster interstate commerce, or to prevent the fl.ow of such commerce from working harm
to the people of the nation. Since the courts are unlikely for some time
to substitute their ideas on what protects or fosters interstate commerce,
or on when it works harm to the nation, for that of Congress, the use
of the marketing quota device offers almost unlimited opportunity for
federal production control as there are few goods not produced to some
extent for the interstate market.
18 See Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2 (19II); Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U. S. 563, 42 S. Ct.
232 (1922); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 452 (1926).
14 United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993
(1939).
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C. Due Process-Limitations on Federal Control
The power to control production is vital to the realization of any·
extensive system of economic planning. It alone cannot, however, insure
that economic stability at which economic planners have aimed. The
fact of production control will normally tend to deter the entrance
of new capital into the controlled fields as long as existing capacity is
adequate to produce the quotas fixed by the government. It is always
possible, however, that some bold adventurer may believe himself
capable of invading a controlled field at a profit to himself. The question will then arise whether he shall be permitted to do so, and, if so,
upon what conditions. Since the device through which federal production control is being effected is by establishing interstate marketing
quotas, the issues that arise are the power of the federal government to
deny such newcomer a quota, and that of its power to condition such
person's right to invade the interstate market.
The denial of a quota would constitute an extreme restriction on
the newcomer's economic liberty and on his right to use such of his
capital as he might desire to embark in his venture. It is still law that
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, is a limitation on Congress in exercising its commerce
power. 15 The question is whether the recent trend in construing due
process clauses as a limit on the substance of legislation has developed
so far as to sustain such an absolute or conditional denial of a quota.
The prohibition in its immediate incidence would be on the marketing
and transportation of goods in interstate commerce. It may be conceded that today prohibition as a form of regulation is not limited to
goods inherently obnoxious or injurious to the public so far as it is a
question of construing the scope of the commerce clause. The issue
under the due process clause is quite different. A prohibition based on
the commerce clause must still conform to the standard of reasonableness to escape condemnation under the due process clause. The prohibitions imposed on railroads by the commodity clause of the Interstate Commerce Act 16 were held not to deny the carriers due process,
largely because aimed at realizing the federal policy against permitting
monopolistic practices in interstate trade. 17 The fact that a prohibition
15 Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592
(1937).
16 35 Stat. L. 584 (1906).
11 United States v. Delaware & Hudson R. R., 213 U. S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527
( 1909).
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is an integral part of a plan for achieving a valid federal policy in the
field of interstate commerce is thus a factor tending to validate it
against objections based on the due process clause. It is not, however,
decisive, since that would mean that a decision sustaining a prohibition
as within the scope of federal commerce power would also determine
that it did not violate the due process clause and thus make the two
issues identical for all practical purposes. It would, in effect, remove
the due process clause as a limit on Congress' commerce power. But, as
heretofore stated, this conflicts with the announced position of the
Supreme Court.
It is difficult to see how any court could determine the reasonableness of denying a newcomer an interstate marketing quota without taking into account the probable effects thereof upon his general economic
liberty. Such denial would in many instances deprive him of his liberty
to devote his labor, skill and capital to legitimate productive enterprises
as effectively as would a direct prohibition of such activities. It is, of
course, true that the whole quota system has that effect even in the
case of those already engaged in the production field being controlled
by that system, in so far as it in effect limits their expansion of such
enterprises. They do, however, acquire offsetting advantages in which
a newcomer denied a quota cannot share, and this alone might be a
factor tha,t made the plan not unreasonable as to them.
Another consideration that might reasonably be urged against the
validity of such denial of a quota derives from its relation to the general national welfare. It is true that courts have recognized that the
choice of economic policies to be promoted lies with the legislative
branches of our governments. 18 In determining the reasonableness of
restrictions on economic liberty, courts have not in fact ignored the
factor that the restrictions resulted in conferring monopolistic benefits
upon one group at the expense of others. The due process clauses do not
wholly prohibit the grant of such monopolistic privileges to private
persons. Such grants have been sustained in the field of public utilities,19 and in the cases of several businesses usually deemed not to fall
within that class.20 Statutes permitting monopolistic business practices
through private agreement have been sustained, as have those that
limited the conduct of strangers to such agreements by prohibiting them
from engaging in certain forms of competition proscribed by those
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
See New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932).
2° California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 26
S. Ct. 100 (1905); Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
18
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agreements. 21 There have, on the other hand, been some decisions that
due process was violated by denying a person the right to pursue a
calling generally recognized as legitimate,22 or by conditioning his
exercise of such right upon proof that existing facilities were inadequate
to meet the public demand for the goods or services proposed to be
produced. 28
The constitutional arguments against and for the validity of such
limitations upon economic liberty are most fully set forth in the majority and minority opinions in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.24 The
former asserted the invalidity of any regulation having the effect of
denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a
lawful private business, and stressed the monopolistic tendencies of
such regulation; the latter equally firmly asserted its reasonableness
as a means for obviating the wastes of excessive and destructive competition. It is obvious from an even cursory examination of the literature referred to in the footnotes to the dissenting opinion that Justice
Brandeis, its author, was much influenced by economic views that are
a large part of the stock in trade of advocates of governmental economic planning. Even the majority opinion admitted the validity of
limiting the right to enter the field of callings affected with a public
interest by requiring applicants to prove that public convenience and
necessity would be promoted by their entrance into the field, and of
conditioning the right of those already engaged therein to expand their
facilities in the same manner.
The old concept of "businesses affected with a public interest" has
now been practically discarded so far as the issue is the constitutional
sphere of governmental price fixing.-2 5 The new meaning is broad
enough to include all businesses subject to control for the public good.
It is also stated in the majority opinion in the Nebbia case that "there
can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures
the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects." 26 If all businesses are now within the class of those affected with a public interest,
a specious basis is afforded for obviating the decision in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmarm by applying to all business what the majority opinion
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distilleries Corp., 299 U. S.
183, 57 S. Ct. 139 (1936).
22 Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 S. Ct. 662 (1917).
23 Engberg v. Debel, 194 Minn. 394, 260 N. W. 626 (1935).
2 ' 285 U. S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932).
25 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
26 lbid., 291 U.S. at 537.
21
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itself admits to be valid for "businesses affected with a public interest."
The opinion in the N ebbia case also stated that

"If the law-making body within its sphere of government concludes that the conditions or practices in an industry make unrestricted competition an inadequate safeguard of the consumer's
interests, produce waste harmful to the public, threaten ultimately
to cut off the supply of a commodity needed by the public, or
portend the destruction of the industry itself, appropriate statutes
passed in an honest effort to correct the threatened consequences
may not be set aside because the regulation adopted fixes prices
reasonably deemed by the legislature to be fair to those engaged
in the industry and to the consuming public. . . . Price control,
like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if
arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy
the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty." 21
The point of view evinced in the dissenting opinion in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann and in the majority opinion in the Nebbia case is
probably a truer reflection of present-day judicial attitudes than that
of the majority opinion in the former of those cases. It is quite likely
that a denial of an interstate marketing quota ( or of any quota so far
as the commerce clause permits fixing quotas generally) unless the
applicant could prove that existing facilities were inadequate or that
public interest would be served by permitting him to enter a given
field, would be held not to violate due process clauses.Nor is it wholly
unlikely than an unconditional denial of a quota to such applicant
would be held valid.
The power to prescribe interstate marketing quotas has thus far
been exercised only with respect to goods already being marketed on
a national scale. Economic instability may, however, arise from the
displacement of demand for existing goods by a demand for other
goods. Such displacement, if on a large enough scale, almost invariably
produces some undesirable social results and economic dislocations.
These frequently include the loss of some past capital accumulations and
unemployment. In the past it has been assumed that the ultimate gain
in social and economic welfare justified these costs and losses. That it
has contributed to the creation of instability in the social and economic
spheres cannot be successfully denied. The question thus arises as to
the validity of applying the interstate marketing quota system to these
27

lbid., 291 U.S. at 538, 539·
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new goods from the time of their first attempts to invade the national
market. The broad terms in which the Supreme Court has defined the
power of Congress to prohibit interstate commerce in Mulford v.
Smith 28 affords little, if any, basis for a view that it would not include
the power to apply the quota system to such newly developed products.
It would appear to permit Congress to completely bar such goods
from the national markets. Nor would the restriction upon individual
economic liberty in such case be any greater than that involved in deny-,
ing a newcomer a quota in a field already occupied, although the social
and economic consequences would be much more serious. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that a federal interstate marketing
quota system, or even complete denial of access to the national market,
would be valid as applied to new commodities that would displace those
already marketed on a national scale, whether or not being marketed
under a federally prescribed quota system.

D. Effects of Federal Control of Production
It has already been pointed out that the validation of federally fixed
marketing quotas for the interstate market indirectly permitted federal
production control. The indirect consequences, however, extend far
beyond that. The power to control production involves a high degree
of control over the accumulation of capital and the direction of investment. It effectively complements the federal government's power to
influence these matters through exercises of its monetary and other
fiscal powers. The reason for this is obvious. Entrepreneurs are unlikely to make investments in fields for which marketing quotas have
already been established, particularly if they may be denied quotas,
conditionally or unconditionally. They are just as unlikely to invest
in industries producing new goods to displace existing goods if they
may be denied access to the national market. It is certain that these
limitations upon investment opportunities will in the long rwi reduce
interest returns and retard capital accumulation. The indirect consequences of this extend throughout the whole of our economic system.
Furthermore, production control is also bound to affect the distribution
of raw materials and of labor employed not only in industries producing for the national market but in other areas of the economic system as well. And lastly, production control necessarily involves control
of consumption. It is not intended by this analysis of the implications
of the doctrine that the federal government may fix quotas for the
28

307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648 (1939).
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interstate markets to suggest that its consequences will be either bad or
good. The sole purpose is to indicate the extensive federal control
of the nation's economic system made possible thereby. It requires no
acute understanding of the history of judicial construction of the commerce and due process clauses to sense that old principles have been
applied in a manner to render them somewhat difficult to recognize.

II
REGULATION OF CoMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND LABOR CoNDITIONsCoMMERCE PowER

It has already been stated that a principal obj~ctive of indirect
federal production control was to create a more stable economic system
than had resulted from what was described as excessive and destructive
competition. The same objective was aimed at by legislation directly
regulating competitive conditions. The power of the federal government to prohibit unfair methods of competition in interstate trade had
been established long before the depression.
The most ambitious attempt on the part of the federal government
to expand the area of economic activities within which it could regulate
competitive methods is found in the system of codes promulgated by
the President under the authority of the National Industrial Recovery
Act. This attempt collapsed completely after the decision of the
Supreme Court in A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United
States.29 The factor that brought down the whole code system was that
the statute authorizing it invalidly delegated legislative power to the
President. The other basis of the decision is more immediately pertinent. The statute was held to exceed the powers of Congress under the
commerce power so far as it authorized the enforcement of the code
against one engaged in the business of the defendant. That business
consisted of the local slaughtering and local selling of poultcy that had
been shipped into the state from points outside it. The code provisions
held invalid as so applied :fixed maximum hours and minimum wages
and regulated defendant's trade practices in selling to retailers. The
Court at several places in its opinion directs attention to the fact that
the government's position would practically impose no limits on its
power to regulate local affairs under the guise of regulating interstate
commerce. The decisions in the lower federal courts prior to this case
were in hopeless conflict as to how far the codes could be validly en29

295,U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
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forced to control what had theretofore been generally accepted as local
activities. The position of the Court in the Schechter case was substantially reaffirmed in .Carter v. Carter Coal Company,"8° so far as it
held invalid the enforcement of those provisions of a code governing
producers of bituminous coal that prescribed maximum hours and
minimum wages and :required employers to bargain collectively with
the duly chosen representatives of their employees.
In so far as the Carter Coal Company case held invalid the collective bargaining provisions of the coal producers' code, the case must
be deemed to have been overruled by the subsequent decisions sustaining the National Labor Relations Act. The right of labor to organize and select representatives of its own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining was declared in a leading case to be a fundamental
right which Congress may safeguard, so far as necessary or appropriate
for the protection of interstate commerce from burdens or injury
caused by the denial of that right. 81 Such protection of labor's right
to organize was brought within the federal commerce power on the
theory that labor disputes resulting from the denial of that right may
cause strikes that hinder interstate commerce where local production
industries derive their raw materials from other states, or sell their
products in such states, or both. 82 It has been stated, in National Labor
Relations Board v. F ainblatt,'88 that the principle extends to an employer not himself engaged in interstate commerce, since strikes and
labor disturbances in his business may adversely affect such commerce.
It has been held a sufficient basis for subjecting a local industry to such
federal control that it sold its electrical power locally to those who
used it in interstate transportation. 84 The logic underlying these applications would equally justify extending the protection to those engaged
in the local marketing of goods obtained from other states, especially
in view of the Supreme Court's assertion in the F ainblatt case that it
was ·immaterial that the volume of interstate commerce involved,
298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936).
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
82 See in addition to the case cited in note 31 the following: Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U.S. 453, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938);
Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938)
94 F. (2d) 61; National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., (C. C. A.
9th, 1937) 94 F. (2d) 138.
88 National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 59 S. Ct. 668
(1939).
84 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor ReJations Board, 305 U. S. 197,
59 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
80
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though substantial, was-relatively small as compared with that involved
in previous cases. It is unlikely that the Court will base any considerable limits on the extension of this principle upon conceptions of when
such commerce is "substantial."
The question naturally presents itself as to how far other types
of federal regulation sought to be imposed under the codes will be
held valid exercises of the commerce power within those fields of
economic activity where the enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act has been sustained. Interference by employers with labor's
right of self-organization is not the only cause of strikes and labor
disturbances that may adversely affect interstate commerce. Such disputes frequently arise over questions of -hours, wages, and the closed
shop. The logic of the decisions last considered would permit federal
regulation of these matters in at least as extensive an area of economic
activities as those in which federal intervention to protect the right of
self-organization has been upheld. Nor is there any basis for limiting
the type of federal regulation of labor relations in this field ( so far as
the commerce clause issue is concerned) to that which is favorable to
labor. It would be absurd to contend that Congressional discretion as
to what means are appropriate to protect interstate commerce is limited
to recognition of those policies that favor labor. If the views herein
set forth be correct, the Schechter and Carter Coal Company cases must
be deemed overruled so far as they held invalid the application to the
businesses therein involved of the code provisions fixing maximum
hours and minimum wages. The fact is that the decisions involving
the National Labor Relations Act make it practically certain that the
Fair Labor Standards Act will be sustained as within federal commerce power in practically all the situations within its terms. The problem of the validity of these regulatio~s under the due process clause
will be discussed in another connection.
It is more difficult to determine how far these decisions warrant
conclusions as to the validity under the commerce clause of other types
of regulation within the field in which the National Labor Relations
Act has been upheld. It may be that it would be more difficult to
establish that certain competitive practices in the production and local
distribution of goods marketed on a nationwide basis affect interstate
commerce adversely, but it should not be impossible to do so with
respect to many of them. The Labor Board Act decisions, however,
reveal a distinct trend towards determining the existence of the appropriate connection between local activities and interstate commerce
by accepting an organic view of the nature of our economic system. If
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with this there be coupled the trend towards according Congressional
decisions a higher degree of deference than has been the wont of courts
at some periods in the past, the likelihood is very great that direct
enactment of many of the rules for regulating competition that were
found in the codes will be sustained for many businesses and activities
that are neither interstate commerce nor a part of the current of such
commerce. There have been no authoritative decisions to help us in
defining the forms of such regulation that will be sustained on this
basis. To speculate without such guidance would be somewhat futile.
It is, however, safe to state that this approach will enable the direct
accomplishment of a considerable degree of federal regulation of local
activities in some way related to interstate commerce in situations in
which Congress may be unwilling to employ the interstate marketing
quota system.

III
REGULATION OF THE INVESTMENT FIELD--FEDERAL INCORPORATION

The great bulk of production for the national market, and the distribution of goods in that market, is carried on in corporate form. The
power of the federal government to control their production and distribution activities through the interstate marketing quota system has
already been established. There is not lacking evidence of a desire for
direct federal control over their financial affairs as well. Congress has
the undoubted power to provide for creating corporations to engage in
interstate commerce.115 What is required, however, is power to exclude
corporations from engaging in interstate commerce unless they submit
to certain forms of regulation involving activities other than those
that constitute a part of interstate commerce. It has sometimes been
proposed to require all corporations wishing to engage in interstate
commerce to incorporate under federal law, and to impose an ambitious
plan of regulation through conditioning the privilege of incorporation
on compliance therewith. It is probably well within federal power
to require that those who wish to engage in interstate commerce in
corporate form procure federal charters. It has been held that due
process is not denied natural persons by a state· law requiring incorporation of those who wish to conduct banks. 86 This furnishes a sufficient basis for the view that a federal law requiring those who wished
to engage in interstate commerce in corporate form to become federal
35
86

Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 14 S. Ct. 891 (1894).
Shallenberger v. First State Bank, 219 U.S. II4, 31 S. Ct. 189 (1911).
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corporations would not violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Such a requirement is less restrictive on individual liberty
than the state statute, since it does not deny a natural person the right
to engage in interstate commerce. It is also probable that Congress
could regulate with respect to such corporations such matters as corporate capital structure, the relations of shareholders to the corporation
and among themselves, the purposes for which securities might be
issued, and any other matters generally dealt with in corporation laws.
The attempt to attach conditions intended to control their local production activities, the methods of competition to be followed in connection with those activities, and their general business policies in connection therewith, would seem of doubtful validity, except where the
regulation thus sought to be imposed could be held valid as an independent matter.
It has heretofore been stated that thoroughgoing planned economy would require extensive governmental control over the direction
of new investment. The activities of both our state and federal governments in this :field have thus far aimed rather to protect investors
against fraud than to secure any particular distribution of new capital
among the uses competing for it. The power of the federal government
to prevent the mails or the channels of interstate commerce from being
used to defraud investors is well established.37 It has never been decided whether it could use those powers to prevent the distribution of
securities issued to :finance new capital investment not made in accordance with its conceptions of socially desirable investment or which did
not comply with the requirements of a planned economy devised by it.
It is doubtful that it would be permitted to so use those powers except
where it could directly control the direction of investment as an independent matter. The :field of public utilities operating in interstate
commerce is one in which it can directly control and direct new investment. The same considerations would probably invalidate its attempts to control the direction of investment through prescribing the
type of legal investments for insurance companies and investment trusts
as a condition to their use of the mails or the channels of interstate
commerce for the purposes of their business transactions. The most
effective method £qr federal control of this matter is by use of its
powers to spend, borrow and tax. The result would be accomplished
somewhat more indirectly, but none the less effectively.

a

87 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U. S.
419, 58 S. Ct. 678 (1938).
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IV
REGULATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

The professed aim of most economic planning is not merely to
eliminate the wastes and avoid the instability of an economy based on
private initiative and the profit motive, but also to insure a juster and
more desirable social order. Some of the particular regulations already
discussed were directly related to that objective. This was especially
.the case with those fixing maximum hours and minimum wages and
protecting labor's right of self-organization. A widely held opinion
considers many of the methods through which it is proposed to create
a juster social order to be equally necessary for the achievement of a
more stable economic system. It is a characteristic feature of nearly
every plan for ameliorating the evils of our socio-economic order
through increased interposition of government that it involves, immediately or ultimately, a redistribution of wealth and income. The
phrase "redistribution of wealth and income" is intended to denote
a distribution other than would have resulted under the system of
private enterprise operating under those conditions of imperfect competition that has generally marked that type of economic system in the
past. It is immaterial for the purposes of the present discussion whether
the intervention of government to effect that change be viewed as
merely restoring wealth and income to those who claim to have produced it or as depriving another class of what it considers itself to have
produced. The technique in any event is one in which wealth and income, and the benefits flowing therefrom, are being diverted from those
receiving them in the first instance to others who may or may not have
had a share in their production. The problems that arise are the extent
to which the federal government can intervene in this process and the
methods by which this purpose can be achieved.

A. The Police Power-Fixing Wages and Prices
The principal governmental powers available for affecting the
distribution of wealth and income are the regulatory or police power,
and the taxing and other fiscal powers. The former will be considered
first, since its use raises issues of the same general types as those already
discussed. An important objective of the policy of encouraging the
formation of labor unions is to place labor in a stronger position to
bargain with capital than the isolated individual laborer would occupy.
This is practically certain to produce increased wage rates, and to that
extent may become a potent factor in influencing not only the total
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income produced within a given period but also its distribution. It is,
of course, true that a mere increase in wage rates may mean no increase
in income to those receiving the higher rates. Moreover, the increase
in unit costs due to the higher wage rates will affect the real income
of other groups, and, for that matter, of the group receiving the increased wage rates as well. The area of economic activities within which
the federal government can affect the distribution of income by this
method has already been discussed, and requires no further treatment.
A more direct attempt to increase the share of the national income to
be received by labor is the enactment of minimum wage laws. The
federal government's power to give such laws a scope at least as broad
as that within which labor's right of self-organization may be protected seems unquestionable, and the basis for this view has already
been set forth. It had been held in the Adkins case 38 that minimum
wage laws deprived both employer and employee of their liberty and
property without due process of law. This position was reaffirmed in
1936 in a case 119 involving a statute that was immune to one of the
most important objections made by the Supreme Court to the statute
involved in the Adkins case. It was effectively reversed within a year
after the decision in-the case last cited.40 This decision, as well as those
overruled by it, involved fixing minimum wages for women only, and
any effective use of the minimum-wage device for promoting a distribution of income desired by government will require its extension to
adult male employees as well. 41 Much of the reasoning used to support
minimum wages for adult women would justify extending the system
to adult men. The payment of extremely low wages to them is just
as likely to be detrimental to their health and to cast a direct burden
for their support upon the community as in the case of women employees. Nor is there any valid reason for not determining the validity
of this form of price-fixing by the general test employed for other
forms of it in the N ebbia case.42 The issue then becomes merely whether
the legislature acted reasonably in concluding that minimum wages
constituted a reasonable remedy for what it was free to regard as an
evil. Judged by this standard, minimum wages for adult men are as
compatible with the requirements of the due process clause as are
minimum wages for adult women.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923).
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 56 S. Ct. 918 (1936).
40 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
41 The validity of minimum wage legislation as applied to employees who are
minors is so obviously valid as to require no discussion.
42 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54_8. Ct. 505 (1934).
38
39
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There is, therefore, no constitutional obstacle to federal minimum
wage legislation for industries and businesses already held to be within
federal control by the numerous decisions involving the enforcement
of the National Labor Relations Act. How much further it may extend
this type of control cannot be now determined. The states can interpose
to enforce such policy in areas of economic activity beyond federal
control. How far the fixing of maximum wages by government would
be valid as a matter of due process has never been judicially considered.
The fixing of maximum prices is an admittedly valid method for protecting the public against one of the socially undesirable results of
monopoly or the lack of effective competition. This has thus far been
most frequently invoked in the case of businesses affected with a public
interest, but it has not been limited to them. 43 .The broadening of the
general field of governmental price control by the N ebbia case undoubtedly extends the field within which it may be used to protect
the public interest by fixing maximum prices. The fact that the threat
comes from labor rather than capital does not affect the application of
the principle. Liability to having its maximum wages fixed is part of
the price labor has had to pay for the right to have its position safeguarded by minimum-wage legislation. Federal intervention to fix
maximum wages would, so far as it is a question of the scope of federal
powers, be valid in any field of economic activity within its power to
prescribe minimum wages.
Labor is not, however, the only economic group that may be receiving a smaller income than government planners deem just or
socially desirable. The technique of fixing minimum prices has been
employed extensively in attempts at increasing the income of agricultural producers. It has. been held no denial of due process for a state
to require milk dealers to pay milk producers a minimum price, even
where the dealer was at the same time required not to make retail sales
below a governmentally fixed minimum price.44 The fixing of minimum
retail prices as part of a general plan for regulating the production
and marketing of milk was sustained in the Nebbia case. 45 It may,
therefore, be taken as established that the state may intervene to raise
agricultural prices by fixing minimum prices required to be paid by
purchasers thereof.
43 See Rottschaefer, "The Field of Governmental Price Control," 35 YALE L. J.
438 (1926); Hamilton, "Affectation with Public Interest," 39 YALE L. J. 1089
(1930); McAllister, "Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest," 43
HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930) ..
44 Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 55 S. Ct. 7 (1934).
¾s Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
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There is no reason why the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment should be construed to prevent the federal government from
fixing minimum prices within the sphere of economic activities whose
control lies within the scope of its delegated powers. The extent to
which it can employ this device is largely a problem as to the scope of
its commerce power. It is quite clear that the Supreme Court was divided in the Guffey Coal Act case 46 on whether that power included
that of fixing prices on interstate sales of goods, although the point
was not decided. It has since been held, in the Rock Royal case "' 1 that
the power which the states have to fix prices for the handling and
selling of commodities in intrastate commerce is vested in Congress
in the case of handling and selling them in interstate commerce. That
case sustained the elaborate federally instituted and controlled system
for regulating the distribution of milk in the New York City marketing area. This system fixed the minimum prices to be paid producers by
handlers of the milk, and provided for an equalization pool that in
effect distributed to producers of low grade milk income to which
producers of high grade milk were justly entitled. Since the system
applied as well to milk produced within New York state as to that
produced outside it, the case may also be taken as establishing federal
power to fix minimum prices for intrastate sales whenever that is an
appropriate means for protecting or promoting interstate commerce
or for effectuating a policy which lies within the competence of the
federal government to promote. This is no new principle, for it had
long been applied to railroad transportation."' 8 The novelty, if any, is
in permitting federal price fixing for interstate sales. There is no reason for limiting the method to the sale of agricultural products or other
raw materials. It is equally applicable to manufactured articles and
services. The only limit is that -on Congress' power to fix prices found
in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that is not a
very serious restriction since the Nebbia case.49 So far as it is a question
of federal power, Congress may fix maximum prices on such interstate
and intrastate sales wherever it could fix minimum prices, and the du<::
process clause of the Fifth Amendment here too constitutes the sole
limit thereon.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936).
United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993
(1939).
48 Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U. S.
563, 42 S. Ct. 232 (1922).
49 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
46

47
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The particular circumstances that will, so far as that due process
clause is concerned, justify price-fixing may vary according as minimum
or maximum prices are being fixed, but that circumstances may exist
under which either will be held valid is undeniable. It should be noted
that federal :fixing of interstate prices is bound to influence intrastate
prices, including local sales at retail. How far it could-directly regulate
such retail prices as an incident to its power to fix interstate prices is as
yet undetermined. The power to :fix minimum prices to be paid by
retailers buying in the interstate market and minimum retail prices on
their local sale may produce rather serious effects upon those whose
prices are regulated in both these ways. It has been held that a state
system of this kind would not deprive a retailer of his property without
due process of law even though it drove him out of business. The Court
charged the loss to competition, and consoled the loser with the comforting doctrine that it is for the legislature to determine whether to
favor the strong at the expense of the weak, particularly where done
to protect the weaker members of some other industry deemed vital
to the state. 50 That the power to :fix interstate prices would include that
of establishing certain price differentials as between different sellers,
and that this would not violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment under some circumstances, may be inferred from the decision of the Supreme Court sustaining state regulations of that character. 51
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs is sufficient to show
that the federal government is equipped with powerful instruments
for intervening in the economic system for purposes of redistributing
income and a:ffecting the competitive situation in vital respects. An
extensive resort to governmental price fixing is practically certain to
be a part of any general scheme of economic planning. Its probable
effectiveness will be enhanced if accompanied by production control.
A government that possesses both these powers over wide areas of the
nation's economic system is in a strategic position to undertake such
planning on a large scale. An appraisal of its chances of achieving the
commonly professed objectives of such planning lies beyond the scope
of this article.
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 S. Ct. 7 (1934).
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 56 S. Ct. 453
(1936); cf. Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 56 S. Ct. 457
(1936).
50
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B. The Taxing Power
The taxing power constitutes a powerful instrument not only for
regulating social and economic activities but also for redistributing
wealth and income. It operates in those ways even when not deliberately used for such purposes. Its conscious use therefor merely requires a deliberate adjustment of the tax system so as to produce the
predetermined results aimed at. It can, consequently, be used as an
instrument for economic planning. This may be done either through
the levying of taxes or through the expenditure of the fund~ raised
by taxation. The question arises as to how far the federal government
can use its taxing and spending powers tp promote its own planned
economy. It was once a well established doctrine that the federal taxing
power might not be used primarily to regulate matters whose regulation lay within the exclusive competence of the states. 52 The courts
in such cases treated the purported tax as a penalty. This is still the
rule, but its importance as a bar to the use of the federal taxing power
for purposes of regulation has lessened because courts are not as inclined to discover the proscribed purpose as once they were, and also
because the scope of federal regulatory powers has been greatly expanded. The same limitation was imposed upon the federal spending
power by the Butler case, 63 but its force has been effectively nullified
by the Social Security Tax cases,5'" which have defined in broad terms
the general welfare of the nation for the promotion of which Congress
may exercise its taxing and spending powers. The so-called tax on
undistributed profits furnishes a clear case of a use of the federal taxing power for purposes of regulation. Its real objective was not re.venue, but to force the distribution of corporate profits instead of accumulating or reinvesting them in a corporation's_own business. Its effect
on one of the customary methods of capital accumulation and on plant
expansion are too apparent to require comment. Its validity, however,
could not reasonably be doubted.
An important device for securing regulation through taxation consists in the discriminatory use of the taxing power. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes some, although not
very serious, limits on a state's resort to this method. The federal tax52 See discussions of this problem in Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 42
S. Ct. 449 (1922); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554 (1937);
F. Couthoui, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 158.
53 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
54 Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct 883 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).
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ing power is not expressly limited by any such provision, and the uniformity requirement, applicable to all but direct taxes, demands territorial uniformity only. 55 It has been decided that the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits arbitrary federal taxation, 56
but the Supreme Court has thus far rejected every claim that particular
tax classifications, assailed as violating that clause, did so. 57 The limits
on the discriminatory use of the federal taxing power in order to promote the kind of economic system which Congress may deem desirable is slight indeed, and may in fact be non-existent. The national government's capacity to affect such matters as production, capital accumulation, investment, and the distribution of income by its system
of levying taxes is thus an important instrument of federal social and
economic planning.

C. The Power to Spend for the General Welfare
The federal government's power to spend to provide for the national general welfare is an even more effective instrument for social
and economic planning. Its use to subsidize programs of production
control has already been mentioned, and the validity thereof discussed.
It is the constitutional basis for such parts of the federal government's
public works program as are not referable to its other delegated powers.
It has been held to validate loans and gifts to states and municipalities
for their own construction projects. 58 The reasons relied upon by the
Supreme Court in sustaining the social security taxes, and the programs
that were to be in part financed by them, would equally support federal
relief projects whenever those could be reasonably deemed appropriate means for promoting the national welfare. A federally financed
and controlled program of slum clearance would today undoubtedly
be held justified as an expenditure for the national welfare, despite
decisions in the lower federal courts to the contrary. 59
The conception of the national general welfare is bound to be
55 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900); Chas. C. Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883 (1937).
56 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927).
57 See Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 833
(1937); National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373, 45 S. Ct. 133 (1924).
58 Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
665; Kansas City Gas & Elec. Co. v. Independence, (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) 79
F. (2d) 32.
59 United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, (D. C. Ky. 1935) 9 F. Supp.
137, affd. (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 684; United States v. Certain Lands
in Detroit, (D. C. Mich. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 345. See contra, Oklahoma City v. Sanders, (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 323.
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extremely vague, and this inevitably means that the extent of Congressional discretion in defining it should not be narrowly restricted
by courts when reviewing its exercise in particular cases. 00 The fact
that the use of the taxing and spending powers for this purpose has thus
far been closely related to attempts to deal with problems growing
out of the depression has led courts, in sustaining it, to emphasize factors
that might not be present in case of its use in other times. However, it
would be unsafe to develop limits on the use of these powers from that
fact. The Constitution contains no express provision that limits their
use to emergency situations, and the promotion of the national general
welfare is as valid an objective of these federal powers in normal times
as in periods of grave emergency. The contents of that general welfare
are not limited to such elements as are associated with social and economic crises. These powers have, in fact, been already used as instruments of social reform and reconstruction of a kind not particularly
associated with problems arising out of the depression, although the
desire to relieve unemployment and to "prime the pump" played a
part in even these instances. The program for rural electrification may
be cited as an example. It is true that the validity of many of the
programs based on these powers has never been judicially determined.
It is a practical and moral certainty that they would be sustained by
the Supreme Court if it were called upon to decide that issue today.
In so far as some of them involve competition with private enterprises,
either by the federal government or by states and municipalities subsidized by it, the federal government possesses an important device
for regulating the conduct of private business enterprise. It needs no
argument to prove the efficacy of this method for effecting a considerable redistribution of both the national money income and real
mcome.
. D. Monetary Powers
The taxing and spending powers comprise but a part of the federal
government's fiscal powers. The power to borrow and that of coining
money and regulating its value are important fiscal powers which have
been expressly conferred upon it. It is obvious that the borrowing
power may be so exercised as to exert a marked influence upon the economic system. Its unrestricted exercise might undermine the general
public confidence, affect the general level of interest rates, or even
produce governmental bankruptcy and repudiation. The consequent
social and economic effects of such a policy are patent to most people.
00

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).

1940]

A PLANNED

ECONOMY

II61

The only bearing of these matters on the subject of this article is that
the need to finance costly methods of economic planning and the redistribution of wealth and income may require so vast a use of the
borrowing power as to produce those results as unintended by-products.
One aspect of the borrowing power that has some importance for our
problem is that it is a source of funds through whose expenditure for
the national general welfare the federal government can enhance its
power to regulate the economic system and to redistribute income in
the manner already discussed with respect to funds derived from taxation. This view is based on the following considerations. The Constitution contains no express limitations upon the borrowing power. The
reasonable construction of its scope would recognize its ancillary character, and limit it to borrowing to finance the costs of executing the
other federal powers. The power to tax to provide for the national
general welfare is one such other power. Hence the federal government
may borrow to finance any activity for which it might exercise its taxing
and spending powers.
It is universally conceded that monetary policies are among the
most important influences affecting economic matters and the distribution of wealth and income. There are those who claim that economic
stability and economic justice can be brought about merely by proper
monetary controls. It is not necessary to assume that extreme position
in order to recognize that a government in a position to control
a nation's monetary system, and to have a decisive voice in determining
its monetary policies, possesses a powerful instrument for economic
planning. The federal government possesses it, and could probably
entirely exclude the states from participating in the process. It not only
has the exclusive power to coin money and regulate its value, but also
to give to the promises that it issues in exercising its borrowing power
such legal tender qualities as will give them the character of a circulating medium. 61 This power to issue fiat money, together with the power
of adjusting the value of the monetary standard without limit, and
that of invalidating any and every contract deemed to interfere with
a federal policy to secure a uniform currency,62 combine to give the
federal government practically unlimited power to experiment in attempting to secure a stable economic system by monetary means. These
powers enable it to interpose to redistribute wealth and income as
between debtors and creditors. The incidental. effects of such attempts
IIO

61 Legal Tender Cases, IZ Wall. (79 U. S.) 457 (1871); Julliard v. Greenman,
U. S. 421, 4 S. Ct. 122 (1884).
62 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935).
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upon the general economic system will almost certainly be considerable,
and a rather large body of opinion believes that they will not all be
desirable. The use of these powers alone will not accomplish many
of the objectives aimed at by economic planners, and resort to the
government's regulatory and taxing and spending powers will still be
necessary. Those considered in this paragraph have their greatest significance in relation to the objective of stability, and to a lesser extent
in relation to a limited redistribution of wealth and income.
The power· to borrow, and that of coining and regulating the value
of money, constitute important bases for federal legislation establishing banking institutions intended to provide credit facilities for various
classes of borrowers. These include the National Banking ·System,68
the Federal Reserve System,6 4, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 65 and the Federal Land Bank System.66 The powers that authorize the federal government to create privately owned and operated
banking systems permit it to subject them to extensive regulation for
the public good. It is inconceivable that any court would invalidate a
regulation appropriate to realizing the purposes for which such systems
were created. The power to fix maximum interest rates chargeable by
them, to fix maximum or minimum interest rates on deposits ( so far
as they are banks of deposit), and that of determining the character of
their permissible investments, all can be fitted into a general scheme
of economic planning devised by the federal government. That government may also itself enter the. field of furnishing credit to the public,
and create governmentally owned corporations for that purpose. The
act creating the Home Owners' Loan Corporation 67 has been sustained
as a valid exercise of its powers to borrow, tax and spend for the national general welfare. 68 This may well prove to be its most effective
instrument for carrying out a proposed economic plan, and it affords
unsurpassed opportunities for redistributing income to accord with the
planners' notions of economic and social justice.
CONCLUSION

. The foregoing discussion has aimed to set forth the constitutional
considerations bearing on the adoption of a federal scheme for a
planned economy through an intensification of control of private ecoFarmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875).
Hiatt v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1924) 4 F. (2d) 374.
65 United States v. Doherty, (D. C. Neb. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 793.
66 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S. Ct. 243 (1921).
67 48 Stat. L. 128 (1933), as amended.
68 United States v. Kay, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 19.
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nomic activities with a minimum of direct governmental operation of
business enterprises. It has aimed to do this by stressing federal powers
to interpose at those points in the economic system that are vital to
the effective functioning of any such planned economy. It was assumed
throughout that those now advocating the proposal had in mind certain
objectives, and the discussion has been framed in the light of that
factor. It may, however, be observed that the conclusion that the Constitution permits a high degree of federal economic planning is not
limited to planning aimed at those particular objectives. The constitutional bases of the federal government's power to devise and operate
a planned economy will be the same whatever the objectives of the
plan may be, although they will affect the character of the concrete
measures adopted for its execution. There undoubtedly exist some areas
of the nation's economic life which it will be difficult for the federal
government to control effectively. The required regulation of these
will have to be left with the states. The discussion of the constitutional
problems to which state actioJJ. here will give rise is beyond the scope
of this article. They will principally arise, so far as they involve the
federal Constitution, under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is patent, however, that, regardless
which government exercises control in particular situations, the enforcement of a system of economic planning will entail increased restrictions
on private economic freedom. The present trend is overwhelmingly in
favor of interpreting due process clauses so as to interpose few barriers
thereto.
The period that has witnessed judicial approval of increasing curtailment of private _economic liberty has been marked by a vigorous
judicial protection of personal liberty in the field of other civil and
political rights. The Supreme Court has accorded them a degree of
protection against governmental interference that is a marked contrast
with its treatment of economic freedom. This is evident from the
numerous decisions in which it has invalidated attempts to curtail freedom of speech and the press.69 It was suggested in an opinion rendered
in one of these cases, invalidating a canvassing ordinance as applied
to canvassers selling religious literature, that the decision was not to
be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing might
69 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1936); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936).
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not be subjected to the type of regulation held invalid in that case. 70
The implied distinction between the exercise of the rights of free speech
and press for economic and other purposes should not, however, be
taken as excluding from the protection of these decisions the exercise
of these rights for the promotion of one's economic interests by urging
the acceptance of economic opinions favorable thereto. The very recent
decisions holding ordinances which prohibited even peaceful picketing
by labor invalid as a deprival of liberty without due process show this
clearly.11 There is no reason why due process should not be held
equally to protect employers in the right to present their side, even to
their own employees. This trend towards increasing protection of these
civil rights is no part of the problem of how far the Constitution permits our governments to embark upon projects for a planned economy.
It has, however, a direct bearing upon it. As already stated, governmental economic planning is bound to produce curtailed economic
liberty. It is highly desirable for, and even essential to, the maintenance of our free institutions and an intelligent operation of planned
economies under our system that the fullest freedom of discussion be
preserved. The greater the restrictions upon our economic freedom, the
greater the need for freedom to present all sides of the issues involved.
The increased protection now being accorded civil rights against governmental curtailment may well be viewed as the sine qua non for preventing a planned economy from becoming a virulent despotism.
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939).
Thornhill v. Alabama, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 736; Carlson v. California,
(U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 746.
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